In the earlier cases, the problem was that the Forms 1040X were substantively reviewed by the IRS and denied on their merits. Only when the cases got to the CFC did the DOJ object that Castro signed the Forms 1040X, though his POA did not authorize him to sign for the taxpayers. In these earlier cases, the taxpayers, relying on a Supreme Court opinion from the 1940s, Angelus Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 293 (1945), argued that the IRS waived the signature defect by disallowing the claims on the merits rather than based on the lack of signature.
In all of the cases decided so far, the Court of Federal Claims has held that the signature requirement is jurisdictional and not subject to waiver. The judges dismissed all such suits without deciding whether a waiver might have occurred if the requirement were not jurisdictional. An appeal to the Fed. Cir. has been taken only in one such suit, Brown, where the Center for Taxpayer Rights, as amicus, has argued that the whole requirement to file a refund claim is no longer jurisdictional under recent Supreme Court case law, so the signature requirement is also one that can be waived or forfeited by IRS inaction.
The Center cited, among other things, an opinion of the Fed. Cir. from 2020 named Walby, a case Carl Smith blogged here. In Walby v. United States, 957 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2020), a pro se tax protester case, a panel of the Federal Circuit joined a panel of the Seventh Circuit in Gillepsie v. United States, 670 F. Appx. 393 (7th Cir. 2016), in questioning, in dicta, their Circuits’ precedents holding that the administrative tax refund claim filing requirement at section 7422(a) is a jurisdictional requirement to the bringing of a refund suit, as probably no longer good law under recent Supreme Court case law.
Mills differs from the prior cases in that, after the first set of Forms 1040X were signed by Castro, the IRS denied them on the grounds that Castro improperly signed them — i.e., not on the merits. So, there could be no argument in Mills (unlike in the prior cases) that the IRS waived the signature requirement. Castro responded by getting the CFC to dismiss without prejudice a prior suit Mills had brought and tried again.
Mills filed new Forms 1040X on which to bring suit. Mills was in Afghanistan, however, where he could not print out the Forms 1040X and sign them. So, he affixed his digital signature to the new Forms 1040X. This was done before the IRS authorized using digital signatures on Forms 1040X. Waiting more than 6 months after the second amended returns were filed, Mills brought suit for refund. The opinion just issued (which had initially been issued 2 weeks ago as a sealed opinion, but is no longer sealed) again holds that the claim filing requirement is jurisdictional — citing prior Fed. Cir. case law, but not mentioning Walby. The court goes on to hold that Forms 1040X at the time these were filed could not be electronically signed. Thus, the court dismisses this second Mills suit for lack of jurisdiction. All may not be lost for Mills, however, who can now, if he so chooses, go back and perfect his Forms 1040X for the third time, this time complying with IRS procedures for electronic signatures.
It is Carl’s view that Mills would not make a good test case for asking the Fed. Cir. to overrule its prior precedent on whether claim filing is jurisdictional to a refund suit because there is no possible way for Mills to argue for waiver on these facts (and, indeed, no waiver argument was ever made by Mills in this case). Although the Court of Federal Claims in Mills may have been wrong to call the requirement jurisdictional, in any appeal, the Fed. Cir. would likely duck the jurisdictional question as not necessary to decide the case — just as it did in Walby. In Brown, deciding whether or not the filing requirement is jurisdictional cannot be avoided, since the taxpayer has an argument for waiver that has not yet been considered by the CFC.
Fellow blogger, Jack Townsend, wrote to Les and I with the following comment:
In the conclusion, the court says:
“This result here is admittedly harsh. Mr. Mills was working overseas under difficult circumstances and made demonstrable efforts to sign the returns as best he could. The IRS could have accepted his digital initials as an appropriate signature but chose not to do so. If it is to process millions of tax-forms each year, the IRS may insist on strict compliance with its procedural requirements. The plaintiff’s second amended returns did not comply with IRS requirements and were therefore not duly filed. Under these facts, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s refund suit and must dismiss the complaint.” (emphasis added by Jack)
In the bold-face, the court says IRS had authority/discretion to accept the returns but chose not to do so. Could that decision be reviewed under the APA arbitrary and capricious standard or some review of discretionary decisions?
Les responded “I would think that an APA claim under 706(2)(A) could have been brought as part of the refund suit. Having failed to raise it the taxpayer is out of luck as the APA would not confer independent jurisdiction.”
Unintentionally, a whole group of taxpayers has been keeping lawyers interested in procedural issues occupied. It’s possible that the Brown case could create some new precedent in the Federal Circuit that could have an impact on other circuits. The digital signature problem faced by Mr. Mills is in some ways similar to the mailing problem faced by Guralnik and Organic Cannabis. In both situations, the rules changed shortly after their failure to follow the old rules. The old rules were changed because they no longer fit the circumstances but the last taxpayers to incorrectly attempt action under the old rules are paying the price.